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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Alfredo Lopez Rocha appeals from the district court's appellate decision 
affirming Rocha's conviction for DUI. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Rocha with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p. 6.) The case 
proceeded to trial. (R., p. 39.) During the trial, over defense objection that it was 
not relevant, the trial court allowed admission of the administrative license 
suspension ("ALS") form. (Trial Tr., p. 44, L. 25 - p. 46, L. 25; State's Exhibit 3.) 
During closing arguments defense counsel argued that an acquittal would 
send a "message" to the "Meridian Police Department" that it is not "enough for 
[it] to say okay, well, you refused, fine, no big deal, let's give you a DUI." (Trial 
Tr., p. 99, Ls. 7-15.) He later expounded on this point, arguing that "maybe" 
forcible blood draws after refusal of a breath test "should be the policy of the 
Meridian City police department." (Trial Tr., p. 114, Ls. 13-22.) Because the 
officer "chose not to" conduct a forced blood draw that is allowed by law but not 
police department policy, "[Rocha] is defending himself on a DUI without any 
evidence being presented against him that he was actually under the influence at 
the time he was driving." (Trial Tr., p. 114, L. 23 - p. 115, L. 6.) 
The prosecution responded to the defense argument that the Meridian 
Police Department had, by policy, deprived the jury of evidence by arguing that 
the policy "should not be held against them." (Trial Tr., p. 123, Ls. 6-14.) There 
are a variety of reasons for such a policy, including concerns about potential 
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liability. (Trial Tr., p. 123, Ls. 15-18.) This last argument, that the policy could be 
a result of concerns about liability instead of an effort to deprive defendants who 
refuse breath testing of relevant evidence, drew an objection that it was based on 
"facts not in evidence." (Trial Tr., p. 123, Ls. 19-20.) The trial court overruled the 
objection. (Trial Tr., p. 123, L. 21.) 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury convicted Rocha of DUI. (R., p. 66.) 
Rocha filed a timely appeal to the district court. (R., pp. 70 Uudgment), 72-75 
(notice of appeal).) The district court affirmed the judgment. (R., pp. 160-72.) 
Rocha appealed to this Court. (R., pp. 174-76.) 
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ISSUES 
Rocha states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the trial court err in admitting irrelevant evidence over 
defendant's objections? 
II. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when it placed before 
the jury facts not in evidence; and improperly shifted the 
burden of proof? 
III. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Alfredo Rocha was driving or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicating substance? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Evidence that a defendant refuses BAC testing is relevant to show 
consciousness of guilt. Has Rocha failed to demonstrate that evidence 
that the defendant was told of the civil penalties for refusal of BAC testing 
before he refused such testing is irrelevant to show consciousness of 
guilt? 
2. At trial defense counsel argued that by following policy and not forcing a 
blood draw after Rocha's refusal the police officer deprived the jury of 
probative evidence, which should be held against the state. The 
prosecutor responded that there were reasons for such a policy unrelated 
to proving innocence or guilt, such as potential civil liability. Has Rocha 
failed to demonstrate that, by asking the jury to draw an inference from the 
evidence different than the one he invited, the prosecutor committed 
misconduct? 
3. At trial the prosecutor argued that Rocha's refusal to provide a breath 
sample was evidence of his guilt. On appeal Rocha claims this was 
fundamental error. Is Rocha's claim contrary to controlling authority that 
he fails to acknowledge or cite? 





Evidence Of The Civil Penalties Rocha Risked When He Refused A Breath Test 
Was Relevant 
A. Introduction 
The trial court admitted evidence that Rocha was informed of the 
administrative consequences of refusing a breath test prior to his refusal to take 
that test. (Trial Tr., p. 42, L. 10 - p. 46, L. 25; State's Exhibit 3.) Rocha argues 
that it was error to admit the ALS form used to explain to Rocha the 
administrative refusal because it was not "relevant" and "its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 4-8. 1) Review of the applicable law, however, shows that 
evidence of the administrative penalties Rocha at least risked by his refusal to 
provide evidence of his BAC content is directly relevant to his consciousness of 
guilt. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). 
1 At trial Rocha objected exclusively on the grounds of relevance. (Trial Tr., p. 
45, Ls. 2, 9-12; p. 46, Ls. 15-19.) An objection on one ground is not sufficient to 
preserve an appellate claim on a different ground. State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 
868, 871, 264 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011). Rocha's claim of unfair prejudice 
may not be considered on appeal because it was not raised below. Even if 
considered, Rocha's claim that he was prejudiced because the jury might have 
deemed the evidence that he accepted a substantial civil suspension of his 
driving privileges rather than provide a breath sample to police as being 
probative of his consciousness of guilt (Appellant's brief, p. 8) fails because, as a 
matter of law, the evidence was relevant for exactly that proposition. 
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C. Rocha Has Failed To Show That Evidence Showing The Administrative 
Sanctions He Accepted Rather Than Provide A Breath Sample Was 
Irrelevant 
The test for relevance is whether the evidence has "any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." !.R.E. 401. 
This inquiry is a question of law, not of fact, reviewed de novo. Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 51,205 P.3d at 1187. Although a judge determines relevance, it is the jury 
that determines what weight or significance to give the evidence. E.q. State v. 
Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 684, 718 P .2d 589, 595 (Ct. App. 1986). It is well 
established that evidence of a defendant's refusal to comply with BAC testing is 
relevant to show consciousness of guilt. State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 309, 328 
P.2d 1065, 1073 (1958); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483,489,680 P.2d 1383, 
1389 (Ct. App. 1984); see South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983). If 
evidence that Rocha simply refused to take a test was, by itself, evidence 
relevant to show he was aware he would not pass the test, evidence that he was 
willing to assume at least the risk of substantial administrative penalties for his 
refusal is even better evidence that he was aware he would not pass the test. 
The evidence was relevant as a matter of law. 
Rocha first argues that the evidence of the ALS warning was not 
admissible because "it improperly references penalty or punishment." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) This was not the objection raised to the trial court, 
however, and should therefore not be considered on appeal. State v. Fordyce, 
151 Idaho 868, 871, 264 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011). If considered, the 
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argument is irrelevant. That evidence of the criminal penalty for DUI was not 
admissible has no bearing on the relevance of evidence of the administrative 
penalty Rocha chose to incur in order to deprive the prosecution of a breath 
sample. 
Rocha next argues that admitting the evidence to show consciousness of 
guilt is an "appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury." (Appellant's brief, 
p. 6.) Once again, this was not the objection raised below; therefore this 
argument was not preserved for appeal. Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 871, 264 P.3d at 
978. Even if considered for its merits, there are none because evidence that 
Rocha would rather endure a driver's license suspension than provide a breath 
sample to the police is, as a matter of law, relevant to show consciousness of 
guilt. 
Finally, Rocha argues that the admission of evidence of the ALS advisory 
was prejudicial because the jury may not have understood the difference 
between the ALS and the criminal penalty. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.) Once 
again, this was not a claim that was raised below and is therefore not properly 
asserted on appeal. Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 871, 264 P.3d at 978. The evidence 
clearly established that the ALS was for refusing to provide a breath sample, not 
for DUI. (State's Exhibit 3.) The claim that the (presumably sober) jury was 
confused by an advisory form regularly understood by drunken motorists is gross 
speculation, completely without foundation in the record. 
The ALS form was admissible to demonstrate Rocha's understanding that 
refusal to provide the police with a breath sample for testing meant a stiff driver's 
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license suspension. Evidence that Rocha was warned of the consequences of 
refusal and still chose refusal was relevant to show consciousness of guilt, as it 
shows a higher likelihood that the refusal was to avoid providing evidence he 
knew would be incriminating. Rocha has presented no viable legal basis for 
believing the evidence was irrelevant, much less that he was prejudiced by the 
possibility that the jury might infer consciousness of guilt from the evidence. 
II. 
The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct By Countering Rocha's Argument 
That The Meridian Police Department Policy To Not Conduct Forcible Blood 
Draws After Refusal Of Breath Testing Should Be Held Against The State 
A. Introduction 
At trial the arresting officer testified that she did not conduct a forcible 
blood draw after Rocha refused a breath test because that was Meridian Police 
Department policy. (Trial Tr., p. 48, Ls. 13-20; p. 79, L. 13 - p. 80, L. 6.) Rocha's 
counsel argued in closing that the Meridian Police Department policy to not 
conduct forcible blood draws after refusal of breath testing amounted to 
spoliation that deprived the defendant of evidence and should be held against the 
state. (Trial Tr., p. 99, Ls. 7-15; p. 114, Ls. 13-22; p. 114, L. 23 - p. 115, L. 6.) 
The prosecutor countered this argument by pointing out that the reason for the 
policy was unlikely to be, as argued by defense counsel, a desire to deprive DUI 
defendants of evidence but instead based on considerations such a risk of 
liability. (Trial Tr., p. 123, Ls. 6-24.) On appeal, as below, Rocha contends the 
prosecutor's argument depends on "facts not in evidence." This argument fails 
because the prosecutor was appropriately responding to a defense argument 
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and merely asking the jury to draw inferences from the evidence different than 
the inferences defense counsel requested the jury to draw. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Even after a 
finding of prosecutorial misconduct, a conviction will not be set aside for small 
errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of 
the trial. See State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367-68, 972 P .2d 737, 745-46 (Ct. 
App. 1998). "The right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-
free trial, but a fair one." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,451,816 P.2d 1002, 
1008 (Ct. App. 1991). Similarly, the function of appellate review is "not to 
discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to insure that any such misconduct 
did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair triaL" 1.9.:. If the jury would 
have reached the same result had the prosecutor's error not occurred, the error 
is deemed harmless. Id. 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's , 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeaL" Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010) (citing 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126, 219 P.3d 448, 
450 (2009)); see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
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C. The Prosecutor's Argument In Direct Response To The Defense 
Argument Was Proper 
A prosecutor has "considerable latitude in closing argument" and is 
"entitled to discuss fully '" the evidence and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15,18, 189 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003)). 
Prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the prosecutor "manipulate[s] or 
misstate[s] the evidence." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986). 
However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a 
prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be 
viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the 
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the triaL" United States v. Young, 
470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider the probable effect that the 
prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence 
fairly." 1st at 11-12. In addition, a reviewing court should not give an argument 
its most damning meaning: 
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to 
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the 
same proportions [as repeated mischaracterizations of an exhibit]. 
Such arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are seldom 
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation 
frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than 
crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify 
prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not 
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have 
its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy 
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less 
damaging interpretations. 
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Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). See also State v. Field, 
144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) ("in reviewing allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep in mind the realities of 
trial") (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 
(1986)). 
The prosecutor's rebuttal argument must be viewed in the context of 
defense counsel's argument that Meridian Police Department policy to not 
conduct forcible blood draws deprived Rocha of important evidence and that the 
jury should send a "message" that the policy was not acceptable. The 
prosecutor's response that the policy was unlikely to be a mechanism to secure 
DUI convictions and was instead more likely motivated by concerns about liability 
was proper in this context. Although neither argument was supported by direct 
evidence of the policy's intent or underlying motivation, both sides were arguing 
reasonable inferences of the effect of the policy. Ultimately it was not 
misconduct for the prosecutor to ask the jury to reach a different inference from 
the evidence than that argued by the defense. 
-' 
Even if improper the argument was harmless. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 
304 P .3d 276, 286 (2013) (after defendant shows error state may show 
error harmless if it did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the verdict). 
The merit of the defense argument that a policy of not forcibly extracting 
evidence a defendant refused to provide was part of a nefarious plot to deny that 
same evidence to the defendant is so ridiculous that undermining it by pointing 
out that the policy probably arose for more mundane reasons denied the 
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defendant nothing. Ultimately it is so extraordinarily unlikely that the reasons 
underlying the policy against forced post-refusal blood draws played an important 
role in the outcome of this case that this Court can confidently declare any error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III. 
Rocha Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor's Argument 
That Rocha's Refusal To Provide A Breath Sample Was Evidence Of 
Consciousness Of Guilt 
A. Introduction 
Rocha asserts that the prosecutor committed fundamental error when he 
made an argument "directed at Mr. Rocha's refusal to take an evidentiary test, 
and how that refusal infers [sic] consciousness of guilt." (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) 
The prosecutor did not commit error, much less fundamental error, by discussing 
properly admitted evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho 
appellate courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that 
the violation in question qualifies as fundamental error .... " State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). "Such review includes a three-prong 
inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persua[sion]." kL The first 
prong requires the defendant show that the alleged error "violates one or more of 
the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights." kL Second, the defendant must 
show the error "plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
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to object was a tactical decision)." Id. Third, the defendant must show the error 
was "not harmless." Id. 
C. Rocha's Argument That The Prosecutor Committed Fundamental Error By 
Discussing The Properly Admitted Evidence Of His Refusal Is Specious 
As already noted above, a driver's refusal to provide a breath sample is 
admissible evidence of his consciousness of guilt. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 
u.S. 553, 564 (1983) (not improper to use evidence of refusal as evidence of 
guilt because "no impermissible coercion is involved when the suspect refuses to 
submit to take the test"); State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296,309,328 P.2d 1065, 1073 
(1958); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 489, 680 P .2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 
1984). The implied consent exception lawfully entitled police to conduct BAC 
testing. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007); 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,712-13, 184 P.3d 215,218-19 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Rocha had no right to withdraw his implied consent. State v. McCormack, 117 
Idaho 1009, 1014,793 P.2d 682, 687 (1990); State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 
909,243 P.3d 1093, 1097 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Idaho courts have long held that a 
driver has no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing" conducted 
pursuant to implied consent.). Rocha's argument that it was misconduct to 
discuss this properly admitted evidence, much less misconduct rising to the level 
of fundamental error, is specious. Even if this Court were willing to overturn 
decades of precedent allowing the admission of evidence of refusal under 
implied consent as evidence of guilt, it was not misconduct, much less 
fundamental error, for the prosecutor to rely on, and comply with, existing law. 
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IV. 
Rocha Has Failed To Show That The Guilty Verdict Is Not Supported By 
Sufficient Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Rocha asserts that, because he was not driving at the time the officer 
encountered him, the evidence was insufficient to show he was under the 
influence at the time he drove. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-23.) Because the 
evidence reasonably allowed the jury to draw the inference that Rocha was 
under the influence at the time he drove, he has failed to show error by the jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603,607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 
131 Idaho at 292,955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 1072. 
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On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeal." Borleyv. Smith, 149 Idaho 171,176,233 P.3d 102,107 (2010). 
C. The Evidence Supports The Reasonable Inference That Rocha Drove 
Under The Influence Of Alcohol 
The DUI statute provides it is "unlawful for any person under the influence 
of alcohol ... to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle ... upon a 
highway" ,," I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). At about 4:30 a.m. Officer Shannon Taylor 
encountered Rocha behind the wheel, asleep, in car sitting at the side of Locust 
Grove Road near the intersection of Victory Road. (Trial Tr., p. 22, L. 5 - p. 24, 
L. 18.) The ignition switch was in the "on" position, although the engine was off, 
and Rocha stated "he was driving his friend," who was also in the car, home. 
(Trial Tr., p. 25, Ls. 5-21.) Rocha further admitted drinking "four beers" 
"approximately two hours before." (Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 22 - p. 27, L. 2.) Rocha 
smelled of alcohol, spoke slowly, deliberately and with a slur, failed field sobriety 
tests, and refused BAC testing. (Trial Tr., p. 24, L. 19 - p. 25, L. 4; p. 29, L. 8 -
p. 48, L. 12.) This evidence supports the jury's verdict finding that Rocha drove 
under the influence of alcohol because the reasonable inferences are that he 
drank a considerable amount of alcohol and drove part-way to his friend's house 
before pulling over and sleeping. 
Rocha claims "no evidence was admitted with regard to the time at which 
[he] was driving, nor was any evidence admitted that he was under the influence 
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of alcohol ... at the time he was driving." (Appellant's brief, p. 22.) Rocha is 
correct that there is no direct evidence of when he drove in relation to when he 
drank. He is wrong, however, when he contends that concluding he drove while 
under the influence would be "pure speculation" because "no leap can be made" 
that he was "impaired" prior to "the time the officer made contact." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 22-23.) Rocha himself admitted he did his drinking two hours 
previously and it was reasonable to conclude there was no two hour delay 
between the consumption of beer and his state of intoxication. Ultimately 
Rocha's complaint about a lack of direct evidence must be rejected. State v. 
Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 134,867 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Ct. App. 1994) (DUI may 
be proved by circumstantial evidence). 
The evidence supports the reasonable inference that Rocha drove while 
under the influence of alcohol. His claim that direct evidence does not support 
the verdict is without merit, because the circumstantial evidence proves his guilt. 
He has therefore failed to show that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
decision affirming the judgment for DUI. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2 
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